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Comments 
License to Discriminate: A Rule for 
Protecting Limited English Proficient 
Persons from National Origin 
Discrimination by State Departments 
of Motor Vehicles 
Brandon T. Lozeau* 
“Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all 
taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins] 
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, 
entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or national 
origin] discrimination.”  
President John F. Kennedy1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1963, President John F. Kennedy advocated for Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), declaring: “Direct 
discrimination by Federal, State[,] or local governments is 
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2021;
M.A., University of Kent–Brussels School of International Studies; B.A.,
University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth.  I would like to thank Professor
Jonathan Gutoff for being my advisor, as well as Nicole Shaw Richards for
providing valuable edits.  Thank you to my friends and family for the love and
support.
1. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job
Opportunities, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 483, 492 (June 19, 1963). 
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prohibited by the Constitution.  But indirect discrimination, 
through the use of Federal funds, is just as invidious . . . .”2  The 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) explains that Title VI 
was first proposed as a means of addressing “the then-common 
practice of denying certain persons access to federally funded 
services, programs, and activities based on their race, color, or 
national origin.”3  Indeed, calling out and correcting invidious 
discrimination, and ensuring it does not infiltrate federally funded 
and assisted programs and activities is the ultimate goal of Title VI 
and its implementing regulations.4 
As of 2017, about sixty-seven million residents of the United 
States speak a language other than English at home, which is up 
more than seven million since 2010.5  Further, almost forty 
percent6 of those who speak a language other than English at 
home—roughly twenty-six million people—informed the United 
States Census Bureau that they speak English “less than very 
well.”7  According to the American Community Survey, published 
in 2015, approximately seven million California residents 
responded that they do not speak English well, while the same was 
true for about three-hundred thousand residents in Michigan and 
roughly eighty-six thousand residents in Rhode Island.8  Vast 
2. Id.





5. Karen Zeigler & Steven A. Camarota, Almost Half Speak a Foreign
Language in America’s Largest Cities, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://cis.org/Report/Almost-Half-Speak-Foreign-Language-Americas-
Largest-Cities [https://perma.cc/239V-DR5P].  States with the largest 
increases from 2010 to 2017 were “Wyoming (up [thirty-three] percent); North 
Dakota (up [thirty] percent); Utah (up [twenty-five] percent); Delaware (up 
[twenty-four] percent); Nevada (up [twenty-two] percent); Maryland, 
Nebraska, Kentucky, and Florida (each up [twenty-one] percent); and 
Minnesota (up [nineteen] percent).”  Id. 
6. Zeigler and Camarota indicate that this figure is solely based on the
respondents’ opinions of their own English language skills and that the U.S. 
Census Bureau does not measure language skills.  Id. 
7. Id.
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DETAILED LANGUAGES SPOKEN AT HOME AND
ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH FOR THE POPULATION 5 YEARS AND OVER: 2009–2013 
(2015).  According to the 2015 American Community Survey, roughly 19.4% of 
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segments of the population of the United States must be able to 
access federally funded and assisted programs in languages other 
than English in order to participate fully and benefit equally from 
those programs.  To exclude millions of people from government 
funded programs because they do not speak English equates to 
widespread and systemic discrimination based on national origin. 
If federally funded and assisted programs are not offered in 
languages other than English, then limited English proficient (LEP) 
persons9 are essentially denied meaningful access and a recipient10 of 
federal funds may be found to be in violation of Title VI.  This is 
because language can be seen as a proxy for national origin as 
individuals are inherently limited in their English proficiency “as a 
result of national origin.”11  When a recipient accepts funds from the 
federal government, the recipient also “accepts the obligations that go 
along with it, namely, the obligation not to exclude from participation, 
deny benefits to, or subject to discrimination an otherwise qualified” 
LEP person based solely on their language (i.e., national origin).12  
Under Title VI, a recipient enters into a contractual arrangement 
whereby the recipient agrees to comply with the statute’s 
nondiscrimination provisions as a condition of receiving federal 
financial assistance.13  The only way a recipient could avoid this 
Californians, 3.2% of Michiganders, and 8.7% of Rhode Islanders self-identified  
as unable to speak English well.  See id. 
9. The federal government defines LEP persons as those “[i]ndividuals
who do not speak English as their primary language and who have a limited 
ability to read, speak, write, or understand English.”  Policy Guidance 
Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to Limited English Proficient (LEP) 
Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087, 74,091 (Dec. 14, 2005).  The data identifies people 
who speak a different language “but speak or understand English less than 
well.”  Id. at 74092 n.7.  
10. For the purposes of Title VI and this Comment, “recipient” means “any
State, political subdivision of any State, or instrumentality of any State or 
political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, or organization, 
or other entity, or any individual, in any State, to whom Federal financial 
assistance is extended, directly or through another recipient, for any program, 
including any successor, assign, or transferee thereof, but such term does not 
include any ultimate beneficiary.”  28 C.F.R. § 42.102(f) (2003). 
11. Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
12. See Chester v. Univ. of Wash., No. C11-5937, 2012 WL 3599351, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2012) (recipient of federal funds could not discriminate 
against “otherwise qualified handicapped individual based solely by reason of 
her handicap.”). 
13. U.S. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986).
See 28 C.F.R. § 42.105 (2003). 
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obligation would be to decline federal funds altogether.14  Thus, if a 
recipient is found to be in violation of Title VI it risks losing federal 
funds unless the recipient takes affirmative steps to rectify the 
discrimination.15   
Title VI states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”16 
Therefore, LEP individuals have a right to meaningful access and 
should be able to participate in and benefit from federally funded and 
assisted programs and activities to the same degree as their English-
speaking neighbors.  However, many LEP persons17 find it difficult to 
access these services because of language barriers and inadequate 
language accommodations. Although LEP persons regularly 
experience difficulties, meaningful access is a critical issue when the 
services in question are essential to everyday life, such as those 
provided by a state’s department of motor vehicles (DMV).  For 
example, if a DMV offers driver’s license examinations and state 
identification card (ID) applications only in English, then LEP persons 
may be unable obtain a driver’s license or state ID.  As recipients of 
federal financial assistance,18 DMVs have an undeniable obligation to 
provide LEP persons meaningful access to their services.19 
14. Chester, 2012 WL 3599351, at *4.
15. 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(b).  “If an applicant or recipient fails or refuses . . .
to comply with any requirement imposed by or pursuant to [T]itle VI or this 
subpart, Federal financial assistance may be suspended, terminated, or 
refused in accordance with the procedures of [T]itle VI and this subpart.”  Id. 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
17. In this Comment, the term “LEP persons” does not include those
individuals who may be living in the United States undocumented.  However, 
it should be noted that undocumented LEP persons are covered by Title VI.  
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–11 (1982) (undocumented individuals are 
considered “persons” when it comes to the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).  
18. According to the United States Department of Transportation’s
regulations, “[f]ederal financial assistance includes grants, cooperative 
agreements, training, use of equipment, donations of surplus property, and 
other assistance.”  Policy Guidance Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to 
Limited English Proficient (LEP) Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087, 74,091 (Dec. 
14, 2005). 
19. Id.  (listing state departments of transportation and state motor
vehicle administrations as recipients of federal financial assistance). 
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The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals do not 
have a private cause of action under Title VI for disparate impact 
discrimination.20  Further, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined 
the requisite intent for disparate treatment claims, therefore, every 
state should enhance discrimination protections for LEP persons 
seeking DMV services by adopting a “minimum threshold” rule that 
would: (1) guarantee LEP persons consistent meaningful access to 
DMV services as the state is the primary provider of important 
services; (2) help states foresee DMV service disruptions to LEP 
communities and take proactive measures to prevent such disruptions 
before they happen; (3) reduce administrative and budgetary burdens 
through improved planning and a reduction in interpreter and 
litigation expenses; and (4) provide greater certainty as to which DMV 
services are readily available in languages other than English for LEP 
customers.21  This minimum threshold rule would require state DMVs 
to provide all services and materials in languages spoken by an 
established threshold percentage of the population.22  Each state 
would enforce the rule and it would provide LEP persons with a private 
cause of action in state courts.  In addition, LEP persons subject to 
discrimination would be able to file a formal complaint with the federal 
government and possibly litigate a Title VI claim for intentional 
discrimination based on national origin.23   
This Comment will first explore three critical Supreme Court 
decisions that shaped Title VI’s application and individuals’ private 
right of action for disparate impact discrimination under the statute.  
20. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281, 289−93 (2001);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 282–84 (1978) (Powell, J., 
plurality). 
21. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 321C-3 (2012) (state health agencies and
covered entities must provide written translations of vital documents to each 
LEP group that “constitutes five percent or one thousand, whichever is less, of 
the population of persons eligible to be served or likely to be affected or 
encountered” by the service, program, or activity).   
22. States’ rules should include a provision where the minimum threshold
is either a specific percentage of the population or a minimum number of 
individuals, whichever is less, who are “eligible to be served or likely to be 
affected or encountered” by the DMVs’ services, programs, or activities to 
ensure maximum coverage.  See id. 
23. Because there is not a private cause of action for disparate impact
discrimination under Title VI, individuals’ complaints must be filed with the 
federal agency or department from which the recipient receives Federal 
financial assistance and any litigation would be brought forward by the agency 
on behalf of the complainant.  See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289–93. 
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In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court held that Title VI allowed 
individuals to properly sue a recipient of federal funding for both 
intentional discrimination and disparate impact discrimination.24  
Later, the Supreme Court narrowed Title VI’s scope in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, finding that Section 601 of the 
statute proscribed only intentional discrimination.25  In 2001, the 
Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval that if regulations 
promulgated under Section 60226 of Title VI prohibit disparate impact 
discrimination, individuals cannot sue to enforce those regulations 
because Section 601 of Title VI forbids only intentional discrimination 
as the Court decided in Bakke.27   
Post-Sandoval, the Supreme Court has offered little direction 
as to exactly what sort of evidence a plaintiff must proffer to 
constitute the requisite “intent” for a disparate treatment claim 
under Title VI.  This Comment will survey standards and factors 
set out in subsequent district court and circuit court opinions, as 
well as incorporate the DOJ’s Executive Order (EO) 13166 
implementation guidance, to show—in the wake of Bakke and 
Sandoval—that one may still be able to show intent when a DMV’s 
facially neutral policies and procedures fail to provide meaningful 
access for LEP persons.  Finally, this Comment will advocate that 
states adopt a minimum threshold rule to guarantee meaningful 
access for LEP persons as required by law, lessen states’ civil rights 
complaints and potential litigation, and prevent federal tax dollars 
24. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
25. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–19 (Powell, J., plurality); see also Sandoval, 
532 U.S. at 281 (reinforcing that Bakke stood for the proposition that “Title VI 
itself reaches only instances of intentional discrimination.” (quoting Alexander 
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985))).
26. Section 602 of Title VI, in pertinent part, states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend 
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of 
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, 
is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d 
of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be 
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute 
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the 
action is taken. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964). 
27. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
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from being used to discriminate against anyone based on race, color, 
or national origin at state DMVs. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Original Purpose and Scope of Title VI
There are several important civil rights laws and regulations
that are meant to protect individuals from discrimination, 
including Title VI.  Specifically, Section 601 of the statute provides 
that no person shall, “on the ground of race, color, or national origin, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity” 
receiving federal financial assistance.28  The phrase “program or 
activity” includes the operations of “a department, agency, special 
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or a local 
government.”29  The DOJ’s Title VI regulations provide in pertinent 
part:  
A recipient . . . may not, directly or through contractual or 
other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting 
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or 
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of 
the program as respects individuals of a particular race, 
color, or national origin.30 
While Congress passed Title VI initially out of concern for 
public school desegregation, the statute includes “every other area 
of federal concern, from agriculture to transportation.”31  Section 
602 of the statute authorized and directed all federal departments 
and agencies that provide federal financial assistance to any 
program or activity32 “to effectuate the provisions of [S]ection 601 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2008).
29. Id. § 2000d–4a(1)(A).
30. 28 C.F.R § 42.104(b)(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
31. Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory
Model for Defining “Discrimination,” 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (1981). 
32. Under Title VI, federal financial assistance could be in the form of a
“grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty.”  42 
U.S.C. § 2000d–1. 
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with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, 
regulations, or orders of general applicability . . . consistent with 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the 
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.”33  
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens supported this 
construction, arguing Section 602 “exists for the sole purpose of 
promoting the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in [Section] 601.”34  
Later, President William J. Clinton signed EO 13166, which sought 
to “improve access to federally conducted and federally assisted 
programs and activities for persons who, as a result of national 
origin, are limited in their English proficiency (LEP).”35   
Title VI is an important and effective tool—independent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause36—in the fight 
against invidious discrimination based on race, color, or national 
origin.37  In a comprehensive review of Title VI’s legislative history 
and its subsequent revisions, Professor Charles Abernathy found 
that the 88th United States Congress “neither intended to mimic 
the Constitution’s [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause nor to create a new 
rigid standard.”38  As part of a complicated legislative compromise, 
Congress embraced “a regulatory model for [T]itle VI that invested 
federal departments and agencies with the power to define the 
discrimination forbidden by [T]itle VI.”39  Rather than adopting the 
Supreme Court’s effects test or intent test, Congress “authorized 
agencies to make the choice through regulations.”40  Although, as 
33. Id.
34. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 304 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). 
35. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. EO 13166 is more bark than bite because Section 5 provides that “[t]his
order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive 
branch and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies, 
its officers or employees, or any person.”  Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 
at 50,121. 
38. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Professor Bradford Mank noted, the Supreme Court’s cases that 
help interpret Title VI are “complex and not easy to summarize.”41 
In its first Title VI case, Lau v. Nichols, in 1974, a unanimous 
Supreme Court adopted the effects test and held that recipients of 
federal financial assistance may not use “criteria or methods of 
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to 
discrimination” or those that have “the effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the 
program [with] respect [to] individuals of a particular race, color, or 
national origin.”42  Under Lau, recipients that utilize such “criteria 
or methods of administration” could be held in violation of Title VI 
not only for intentional discrimination but also disparate impact 
discrimination.43 However, the Supreme Court in 1978 
significantly curtailed Title VI’s application in Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.44  There, a fractured bench45 
strongly suggested proof of intentional discrimination was required 
to establish that a recipient had violated Title VI.46  While Bakke 
did not invalidate Lau’s effects test, the Supreme Court took a 
significant step towards eliminating individuals’ right to sue for 
disparate impact discrimination under the statute.47 
Despite the Bakke decision, federal agencies were still allowed 
to adopt regulations under Section 602 that would prohibit 
disparate impact discrimination.48  The Title VI landscape was 
completely altered in Alexander v. Sandoval when the Supreme 
Court held that private parties could no longer sue to enforce 
41. Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?,
71 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 517, 517 (2003). 
42. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 565, 568 (1974) (quoting 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(2)).
43. Id. at 567–68.
44. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001) (explaining that
Bakke’s limitation of Title VI discrimination to that under the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rendered disparate impact 
discrimination outside of the scope of the statute). 
45. In Bakke, nine justices issued a total of six opinions: Justice Powell
wrote the judgment and two different blocs composed of four justices each 
joined various parts of Powell’s opinion.  See generally Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1973). 
46. See id. at 318–19; Mank, supra note 41, at 522.
47. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1.
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regulations promulgated under Section 602 that include types of 
discrimination not covered under Section 601, namely disparate 
impact discrimination.49  Following Sandoval, private causes of 
action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI are not 
justiciable.50   
B. Providing Meaningful Access Under Title VI and Executive
Order 13166
EO 13166 directed the DOJ to develop implementation 
guidance for recipients funded through the department’s 
programs.51  The DOJ published its guidance in 2002 and it 
subsequently became the model for all federal departments and 
agencies.52  The guidance suggests recipients consider four factors 
when they develop policies to provide meaningful access for LEP 
persons:  
(1) The number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be
served or likely to be encountered by the program or
grantee; (2) the frequency with which LEP [persons] come
in contact with the program; (3) the nature and importance
of the program, activity, or service provided by the program
to people’s lives; and (4) the resources available to the
grantee/recipient and costs.53
The DOJ emphasized that the intent of the above guidance was to 
“suggest a balance that ensures meaningful access by LEP persons 
to critical services while not imposing undue burdens on small 
business, local government, or small nonprofits.”54  The DOJ 
implicitly recognized that state-government departments and 
49. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 292.
50. Id.  Individuals can lodge Title VI disparate impact discrimination
claims with federal funding agencies through an administrative process.  See, 
e.g., File a Title VI Complaint with the FRA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
https://railroads.dot.gov/resource-center/title-vi-civil-rights-act-1964/file-title-
vi-complaint-fra [https://perma.cc/4L68-VBGM] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
51. See Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
52. See Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin 
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 
41,455, 41,455 (June 18, 2002). 
53. Id. at 41,459.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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agencies could shoulder a greater burden than small businesses, 
local government, or small nonprofits, and could make the 
investments necessary to provide meaningful access in compliance 
with Title VI.55 
1. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Title VI in Lau v.
Nichols Protected LEP Persons from Disparate Impact
Discrimination
In Lau, representatives of nearly two thousand “non-English-
speaking students of Chinese ancestry” claimed that San Francisco 
school officials failed to provide instruction on par with instruction 
given to the students’ English-speaking peers, denying thousands 
of non-English-speaking students a meaningful education in 
violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause 
and Title VI.56  Lower courts held that the school officials did not 
intentionally discriminate against the students because the city 
provided  the plaintiffs with the same educational opportunities 
afforded to all other students57 and any inequality in educational 
outcomes was the result of the plaintiffs’ own “advantages and 
disadvantages” they “[brought] to the starting line of [their] 
educational career[s].”58  
The Supreme Court overturned the court of appeals, reasoning 
that because school attendance in California was compulsory and 
students were required to demonstrate English proficiency in order 
to graduate, there was “no equality of treatment” since the 
plaintiffs were “effectively foreclosed from any meaningful 
education.”59  Using an “effects test,” the Supreme Court found that 
violations under Title VI included any action that had the effect of 
discrimination to “national-origin minorities.”60  This meant that 
individuals subjected to “disparate impact” discrimination61 based 
55. See id.
56. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974).
57. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 16.
58. Id. (quoting Lau, 493 F.2d at 797).
59. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566; Abernathy, supra note 31, at 16.
60. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 17.
61. “Disparate impact discrimination” is discrimination resulting from
policies, practices, or rules that may be neutral on the surface, but have a 
disproportionate impact on a protected group of people.  What are Disparate 
Impact and Disparate Treatment?, SOC’Y OF HUMAN RES. MANAGERS, 
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on race, color, or national origin may sue a recipient under Title 
VI.62  The Lau Court “clearly considered [T]itle VI to be more than
simply a remedy for equal protection violations.”63  If Title VI were 
only a remedy for equal protection violations, there would not have 
been much of a reason to include the title in the Civil Rights Act in 
the first place.  Professor Abernathy argued that “[t]he Court in Lau 
relied on the statute, and its underlying regulations, to define a 
violation as any action that has the ‘effect’ of denying educational 
opportunities to national-origin minorities.”64  The regulations in 
question “forbade funding recipients to take actions that had the 
effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national 
origin.”65  Correctly, the Court proclaimed that Title VI prohibited 
disparate impact discrimination because “[d]iscrimination is barred 
which has the effect even though no purposeful design is present.”66 
C. The Supreme Court Questions Lau and Title VI’s Scope
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the
City of New York, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall 
pointed out that Congress did not define the term “discrimination” 
in the statute, arguing Congress deliberately chose not to do so in 
order to grant federal agencies the flexibility to define the word’s 
meaning in a way most suitable to their individual needs.67  At the 
time, Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the statute allowed for a 
private cause of action for both intentional and disparate impact 
discrimination.68  Indeed, even the late Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia argued that courts “should refuse to consider a 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-
qa/pages/disparateimpactdisparatetreatment.aspx [https://perma.cc/KP53-
B7EQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
62. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Lau, 414 U.S. at 566, 568) (emphasis added).
65. Mank, supra note 41, at 521 (emphasis added).
66. Lau, 414 U.S at 568.  See also Mank, supra note 41, at 521.  Professor
Mank underlined the Court’s stance in Lau, noting that “[t]he Court stated 
that the [S]ection 602 disparate impact regulations simply ‘[made] sure that 
recipients of federal aid . . . conduct[ed] any federally financed projects 
consistently with [Section] 601.’”  Id. (quoting Lau, 414 U.S. at 570).  
67. Mank, supra note 41, at 529 (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463 U.S 582, 622–23 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
68. Id.
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statute’s legislative history because it is the text alone that is 
enacted by Congress and presented to the President for his 
signature or veto.”69  A textualist approach would lead one to 
believe that because the statute does not prohibit only intentional 
discrimination, then the statute proscribes both intentional 
discrimination and disparate impact discrimination because both 
fall within the plain meaning of discrimination as it is written in 
Title VI.70  As Justice Stevens explained in Sandoval, “[Section] 602 
explicitly states . . . agencies are authorized to ‘effectuate’ [Section] 
601’s antidiscrimination mandate,” arguing that “[t]he plain 
meaning of the text reveals Congress’ intent to provide the relevant 
agencies with sufficient authority to transform the statute’s broad 
aspiration into social reality.”71   
While Bakke did not overrule Lau, the Supreme Court openly 
questioned the fundamental result of Lau’s holding and expressed 
“serious doubts concerning correctness of what appear[ed] to be the 
premise of [the Lau] decision.”72  In Bakke, the respondent alleged 
the University of California at Davis admissions program73 violated 
69. Id. at 530 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99
(1991); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–77 (2001)). 
70. Id.
71. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 305–06 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1).  This Comment will not address the 
“Chevron doctrine,” a well-established principle of administrative law, which 
provides that “when the agencies charged with administering a broadly worded 
statute offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete guidance 
as to its implementation, [the Court] treat[s] their interpretation of the 
statute’s breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable 
construction of the statutory text.”  Id. at 309. 
72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 352 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
73. The medical school’s admissions program in 1973 allowed candidates
to indicate on their applications whether they wanted to be considered as 
“economically and/or educationally disadvantaged.”  Id. at 274 (Powell, J., 
plurality).  On the 1974 version of the medical school’s application, the school 
asked applicants if they wanted to be considered as part of a “minority group,” 
that is, whether the student was “black,” “Chicano,” “Asian,” or “American 
Indian.”  Students that indicated they were a member of a minority group were 
then separated out and went through a similar admissions procedure to non-
minority students, except that they were not required to meet the minimum 
2.5 grade point average threshold applied to non-minority applicants.  Id.  
While many white disadvantaged students applied through the special 
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the California Constitution, Title VI, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it considered race 
in the school’s admissions decisions.74  While the University’s 
admissions procedures led to an increase in enrollment of Black, 
Mexican-American, Asian, and American Indian students, the 
school’s special admissions program for “disadvantaged” applicants 
did not accept any white students even when white applicants 
qualified as “disadvantaged.”75  Respondent Allan Bakke had a 
strong application,76 but the medical school rejected him while four 
slots remained available through the special admissions program, 
slots for which he was not considered.77  As a result, Bakke claimed 
the special admissions program effectively excluded him from the 
medical school on the basis of race.78  
The Supreme Court then suggested the constitutional 
standards of the Equal Protection Clause were also applicable to 
Title VI.79  Writing for the majority, Supreme Court Justice Lewis 
F. Powell, Jr., opined that Title VI prohibited only those racial
admissions program, none were considered for places as the special admissions 
committee only considered special applicants that were members of one of the 
above minority groups.  Id. at 276. 
74. Id. at 269–70.
75. Id. at 275–76.  While the University did not explicitly define the term
“disadvantaged” in its admissions procedures, each application submitted via 
the special admissions program was reviewed to see if it “reflected economic or 
educational deprivation.”  Id. at 274–75. 
76. In both years in which Bakke’s application was rejected, he scored
higher on the MCAT, had a better grade point average, and received a higher 
benchmark admission score than several applicants admitted under the special 
admissions program.  Id. at 277.  
77. Id. at 276.
78. Id. at 277–78.
79. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 2 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell,
J., plurality) (Title VI prohibits only state actions that would violate the Fifth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause)); 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325, 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (Title VI meaning of discrimination mirrors its meaning in Constitutional 
context).  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
only intentional discrimination, which can occur in any of three ways: (1) a law 
or policy may explicitly classify citizens on the basis of a protected category; (2) 
a facially neutral law or policy may be applied differently on the basis of 
membership in a protected category; or (3) a facially neutral law or policy may 
be applied evenhandedly but motivated by discriminatory intent.  Faith Action 
for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 751134 at *5 (D. 
Haw. Feb. 23, 2015).  
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classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the 
Fifth Amendment, finding that legislative intent was clear in that 
Title VI gave no rights other than those guaranteed by the 
Constitution.80  However, the Supreme Court ultimately decided 
not to address whether Title VI granted a private cause of action 
for disparate impact discrimination because the issue was neither 
argued nor decided in the lower courts.81  Thus, the question 
remained unresolved until Alexander v. Sandoval.82   
D. Sandoval Significantly Curtailed Title VI’s Scope, Limiting
Private Individuals’ Right to Action to Only Instances of
Intentional Discrimination
In a contentious five–four decision issued on April 24, 2001, the 
Supreme Court further restricted Title VI’s effectiveness and 
severely limited communities’ ability to fight invidious 
discrimination.83  Martha Sandoval, individually and on behalf of 
all others similarly situated, brought a class action suit against the 
State of Alabama.84  Sandoval asserted that the State’s policy of 
administering driver’s license examinations only in English85 had 
a discriminatory impact on non-English speakers based on their 
national origin, which Sandoval claimed violated her rights under 
Title VI.86  Both the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Alabama and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit rejected Alabama’s argument that Title VI did not 
give Sandoval a cause of action to enforce disparate impact 
regulations promulgated under Section 602.87  However, the 
Supreme Court held that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as 
80. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J., plurality).
81. Id. at 283.
82. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 279.
85. In 1990, the State of Alabama amended its constitution to declare that
English was the state’s official language—pursuant to its newly amended 
constitution, the Alabama Department of Public Safety decided to administer 
state driver’s license exams only in English.  Id. at 278–79 (citing ALA. CONST. 
amend. 509 (1990)). 
86. Id. at 279.
87. Id.; see Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 511 (11th Cir. 1999); see also
Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
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later amended [did] Title VI display an intent to create a 
freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations 
promulgated under [Section] 602.”88  Thus, Sandoval did not have 
a private cause of action absent proof of intentional discrimination. 
 Invoking prior Title VI decisions, Justice Scalia emphasized 
that “the Court made clear under Bakke only intentional 
discrimination was forbidden by [Section] 601,”89 and reaffirmed 
the Court’s previous holding that “Title VI itself directly reaches 
only instances of intentional discrimination.”90  Sandoval found 
that it was “clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not 
simply apply [Section] 601—since they indeed forbid conduct that 
[Section] 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right of 
action to enforce [Section] 601 does not include a private right to 
enforce these regulations.”91  Sandoval finally put to rest the 
question of whether Title VI conferred a private cause of action to 
enforce disparate impact regulations under Section 602.92  Justice 
Scalia concluded that Section 602 did not confer a private cause of 
action to enforce disparate impact regulations because “a failure to 
comply with regulations promulgated under Section 602 that is not 
also a failure to comply with Section 601 is not actionable.”93  The 
Supreme Court further opined that Section 602 did not create new 
rights, but merely limited federal agencies to “effectuating” those 
rights already created under Section 601.94  Justice Scalia 
highlighted a lack of evidence “anywhere in the text to suggest that 
Congress intended to create a private right to enforce regulations 
promulgated under [Section] 602.”95  However, this textualist 
88. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
89. Id. at 281 (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463
U.S. 582, 610–11 (1983)). 
90. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (internal
quotes omitted)). 
91. Id. at 285–86 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (a “private plaintiff may not 
bring a [suit based on a regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited 
by the text of [the statute]”)). 
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id.  The Court also noted that “[l]ike substantive federal law itself,
private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”  
Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)). 
94. Id. at 289.
95. Id. at 291.
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argument works both ways as there is also no evidence anywhere 
in Title VI that Congress intended to exclude disparate impact from 
the discrimination described in Section 601.96   
Arguing stare decisis,97 Justice Stevens pointed out in his 
dissent that “[w]hen this Court faced an identical case [twenty-
seven] years ago, all the Justices believed that private parties could 
bring lawsuits under Title VI and its implementing regulations to 
enjoin the provision of governmental services in a manner that 
discriminated against non-English speakers.”98  Comparing Title 
VI to its “gender-based twin,” Title IX, Justice Stevens highlighted 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
where the Court looked at Title VI and Title IX side by side and 
“examined the text of the statutes, analyzed the purpose of the 
laws, and canvassed the relevant legislative history,”99 concluding 
that there was “no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX 
remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it 
understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of 
action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.”100  In addition, 
Justice Stevens concluded that one must assume Congress was 
“fully informed as to the state of the law” and would have indicated 
its intention to limit Title VI to only intentional discrimination 
because it was not Congress’ first time writing legislation and 
Congress would have included language limiting Title VI to only 
intentional discrimination if that was its legislative intent.101  
Indeed, Title VI went through a rigorous legislative process that 
offered many opportunities to make such a change before the 
96. Section 601 simply states that “No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1964). 
97. Justice Stevens argued that he would have affirmed “the decision of
the Court of Appeals as a matter of stare decisis.”  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 302 
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (emphasis in the original).   
98. Id. at 296 (emphasis added).  Justice Stewart explained in Lau that
regulations promulgated under section 602 may “go beyond . . . [Section] 601” 
provided that they are “reasonably related” to section 601’s antidiscrimination 
mandate.  Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
99. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297.
100. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)).
101. Id. at 314.
140 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:123 
statute passed both the United States House of Representatives 
and the Senate.102 
As Professor Mank pointed out, even if private plaintiffs may 
no longer enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations through a 
private cause of action, the Supreme Court at some point must 
consider “whether federal agencies may invoke penalties or 
terminate funding to recipients because of a finding of disparate 
impact discrimination.”103  Professor Mank argued that “[e]very 
significant federal agency has disparate impact regulations 
pursuant to [S]ection 602 of Title VI,” and that inevitably a 
recipient “will appeal an adverse decision by a federal agency using 
disparate impact regulations and courts will have to address the 
issue.”104  
E. Determining “Intent” Under a Post-Sandoval Scheme
Sandoval requires plaintiffs to prove intentional 
discrimination in Title VI claims,105 however, the Supreme Court 
did not provide much additional guidance or factors for how lower 
courts should assess whether or not an official action that results 
in discrimination based on a person’s race, color, or national origin 
rises to the requisite level of intent for a plaintiff to succeed in a 
private cause of action.106  However, subsequent cases in district 
courts in Hawaii, New Jersey, Ohio, and the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals,107 paired with guidance from the DOJ, are instructive and 
collectively provide some useful tests for future Title VI claims.108  
102. See id.
103. Mank, supra note 41, at 540.  Professor Mank also pointed out,
“[p]ursuant to [S]ection 602 of Title VI, federal agencies must investigate 
complaints of discrimination and may impose sanctions if there is evidence of 
discriminatory impacts.”  Id. at n.155 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1). 
104. Id.
105. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279.
106. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp.
2d 486, 497 (D.N.J. 2003). 
107. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548 (3rd Cir. 2002); Faith Action for
Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 751134 at *1 (D. 
Haw. Feb. 23, 2015); Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Ohio 
2003). 
108. It is worth noting that the DOJ’s guidance for federal funding
recipients on how to provide meaningful access for LEP persons was published 
in 2002 (after Sandoval) and serves as the model for all federal departments 
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Even absent a cause of action for disparate impact under either the 
Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, the United States District 
Court for the District of Hawaii in Faith Action for Community 
Equity v. Hawaii (FACE) stressed that “disparate impact ‘is not 
irrelevant’ to a claim of intentional discrimination.”109   
Post-Sandoval, at least one federal district court has found that 
a recipient’s agreement to administer a federally-assisted program 
and subsequent failure to provide services in accordance with Title 
VI’s nondiscrimination provisions were enough to defeat a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings.110  In Almendares v. Palmer, the 
Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and the 
Lucas County Department of Job and Family Services (LCDJFS) 
accepted federal funding for the county’s food stamp program, and, 
therefore, agreed to administer the program in accordance with the 
Food Stamp Act (FSA) and Title VI.111  The plaintiffs in Almendares 
were “low-income Spanish-speaking persons” who contended that 
“notices, applications, and written communications from ODJFS 
and LCDJFS [were] almost exclusively in English,” and that 
LCDJFS “[did] not have employees available who [were] able to 
speak to plaintiffs in Spanish.”112  The plaintiffs asserted that 
defendants effectively denied them their right to “participate 
equally in the federal food stamp program.”113  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the ODJFS and LCDJFS failed to conduct the program 
in accordance with the FSA and Title VI “by using criteria or 
methods of program administration that intentionally 
discriminate[d] on the basis of national origin.”114 
and agencies.  See generally Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance 
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin 
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 
41,455 (June 18, 2002). 
109. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21136,
at *15 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)). 
110. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
111. Id. at 802.  “Title VI excludes from participation in federal assistance
recipients of aid that discriminate against racial groups.  The ODJFS and 
LCDJFS accept[ed] federal funding from the United States Department of 
Agriculture and are therefore subject to the restrictions of Title VI.”  Id. 
112. Id. at 800.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 801.
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 The ODJFS and LCDJFS argued that the Supreme Court in 
Bakke and Sandoval made it clear that in order to state a claim 
under Title VI, “a private individual must allege intentional 
discrimination, not disparate impact.”115  However, United States 
District Judge James G. Carr concluded that the plaintiffs’ 
complaint successfully alleged the “essential elements of a Title VI 
claim” based on national origin.116  Judge Carr found that “[t]he 
existence of the mandate [FSA and its regulations requiring 
bilingual services] and the defendants’ alleged knowing and long-
term noncompliance show[ed], arguably, an intent to treat Spanish-
speaking recipients of food stamps differently than English-
speaking recipients.”117  He concluded that “Spanish-speakers [did] 
not have the same access to food stamps as English-speakers 
[did].”118  The judge also observed that “since Sandoval, there is no 
clear precedent as to what a plaintiff must allege to present a claim 
for intentional discrimination” under Title VI.119   
 Even without much case law after Sandoval, it remains that 
“[c]laims of intentional discrimination can be based on facially 
neutral laws or practices.”120  An assessment of whether 
115. Id. at 803 (“Section 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.”
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 (2001))). 
116. Id.  Judge Carr referenced his response to the State’s argument in their
previous motion to dismiss that the plaintiffs must have alleged that the 
defendants intentionally treated similarly situated persons differently on the 
basis of national origin.  Id. at 803.  There, he stated that:  
Plaintiffs’ complaint, however, allege[d] that they [were] being treated 
differently.  Plaintiffs allege[d] that they [were] being discriminated 
against on the basis of their Spanish language—thus, their ethnic 
origin—due to the failure to implement programs mandated by federal 
law.  The existence of the mandate and the defendants’ alleged 
knowing and long-term noncompliance show[ed], arguably, an intent 
to treat Spanish-speaking recipients of food stamps differently than 
English-speaking recipients. 
Id. at 803 (quoting Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00CV7524, 2002 WL 
31730963, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002)). 
117. Id. at 804 (quoting Almendares, 2002 WL 31730963, at *10).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 805 (“As we made clear in Washington v. Davis . . . and Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. . . . even if a neutral law has a 
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a 
discriminatory purpose.”  (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
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discrimination is intentional or unintentional may still begin with 
a close look at the “impact of the official action” as an “important 
starting point,”121 since the impact of an official action or policy is 
often indicative of the reasons why an action or policy was first 
created.122  In another post-Sandoval decision, the Third Circuit 
reversed a Pennsylvania district court decision, holding that a class 
of African-American student athletes sufficiently stated a claim for 
intentional discrimination because the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) “knew—via various studies and reports—that 
the heightened academic requirements” in the association’s newly 
adopted scholarship and athletic eligibility criteria would “reduce 
the percentage of black athletes who could qualify for athletic 
scholarships.”123  The Third Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
argument on their theory of “deliberate indifference,” but found 
that the plaintiffs could potentially prove the NCAA’s 
discrimination was intentional and remanded the matter for 
further proceedings.124 
256, 272 (1979))).  In Feeney, the Supreme Court held that in order to prove 
intentional discrimination by a facially neutral policy, a “plaintiff must show 
that the rule was promulgated or reaffirmed because of, not merely in spite of, 
its adverse impact on persons in the plaintiff’s class.”  Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 
U.S. at 279). 
121. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).  In Arlington Heights,
the Supreme Court stated: 
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a 
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.  The 
impact of the official action—whether it “bears more heavily on one 
race than another,”—may provide an important starting point.  
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing 
legislation appears neutral on its face. 
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). 
122. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 487 (1997) (“[T]he
impact of an official action is often probative of why the action was taken in 
the first place since people usually intend the natural consequences of their 
actions.”). 
123. Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2002).
124. Id. at 570.  Judge Michel wrote: “[A]s Plaintiffs suggest, [Proposition
16] is void on its face provided Plaintiffs can establish that the NCAA adopted
Proposition 16 (and, thus, the condition contained in the Plaintiffs’ [National
Letters of Intent]) for the purpose of intentionally discriminating on the basis
of race.”  Id.
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In Pryor, Circuit Judge Paul R. Michel accused the plaintiffs of 
attempting “to sidestep [Sandoval] by claiming that the NCAA was 
not just indifferent to Proposition 16’s alleged disparate impact on 
black athletes” but that the defendant was  “extremely indifferent 
to that impact even if it did not intend to discriminate.”125  Judge 
Michel saw “no meaningful difference between the proffered 
‘deliberate indifference’ standard and the rule, well settled by the 
Supreme Court, that a [decision maker] will not commit purposeful 
discrimination if it adopts a facially neutral policy ‘in spite of’ its 
impact, not ‘because of’ that impact.”126  Judge Michel concluded 
that the plaintiffs’ substitution of intentional discrimination for 
deliberate indifference would “eviscerate the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in [Sandoval].” 127  Therefore, the district court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ “deliberate indifference” standard as a theory of relief 
under Title VI.128   
If decision makers’ policies and procedures result in 
unintended discriminatory effects, then the recipient would likely 
take corrective steps once the discriminatory impact is apparent. 
Decision makers could either amend or replace the policies or 
choose to leave the policies intact and allow the discriminatory 
effects to continue.  A deliberate choice to leave discriminatory 
policies intact despite their effects could not, by definition, be 
considered unintentional.129  The discriminatory impact—which 
may have been unintentional initially—clearly becomes intentional 
upon the decision makers’ choice to allow the discrimination to 
continue unmitigated.  More than deliberate indifference, the 
decision makers’ choice to allow discriminatory impacts to continue 
uncorrected is just as invidious as intentional discrimination. 
Similarly, if a recipient’s policies and practices have discriminatory 
effects and those discriminatory effects are brought to the 
125. Id. at 567.
126. Id. (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)). 
127. Id. at 568.
128. Id.
129. According to U.S. Legal, an omission becomes an intentional act when
a person intentionally fails to take action and has knowledge of the action that 
could be taken.  See Intentional Omission, U.S. LEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/intentionalomission/#:~:text=An%20intention
al%20omision%20 is%20the,the%20item%20being%20left%20out 
[https://perma.cc/KSM5-49ZW] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020). 
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recipient’s attention—and the policies and practices remain in place 
due to a subsequent failure to mitigate—then the recipient has now 
engaged in intentional discrimination. 
F. A Minimum Threshold Rule for DMVs is a Win-Win for States
and Their LEP Residents
Although some states may have already developed language 
access policies,130 the adoption of a minimum threshold rule would 
reduce states’ administrative burdens and provide greater access 
and benefits to their LEP constituents.  While the Supreme Court 
has held that individuals no longer have a private cause of action 
for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI, LEP persons 
who do not have meaningful access to DMV services offered only in 
English may still be able to allege intentional discrimination with 
the right kind of evidence.131  Absent a clear set of factors from the 
Supreme Court, we glean insight from several lower courts and the 
DOJ to navigate a possible path forward for individuals to 
successfully allege intentional discrimination claims based on 
national origin.  The next section of this Comment will highlight 
some factors plaintiffs have argued, with varying degrees of 
success, to prove intent in a post-Sandoval world.132  A minimum 
threshold rule could moderate the effectiveness of these “intent” 
arguments advanced in lower courts.133  
II. PROVING INTENT IN A POST-SANDOVAL WORLD
Imagine an LEP person goes to their state’s DMV to apply for 
a driver’s license and requests an examination in Spanish. 
Assuming that the DMV does not have driver’s license 
examinations in any languages other than English, the DMV 
worker either offers the applicant an English-language exam or 
130. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 26 (Oct. 6, 2011); Mass. Exec. Order No.
526 (Feb. 17, 2011). 
131. See supra Section I.D.
132. Factors include disparate impact, history of state action, and
foreseeability and knowledge of discriminatory effect, among others.  Pryor, 
288 F.3d at 563; S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 
F. Supp. 2d 486, 497 (D.N.J. 2003); Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d
799, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
133. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 569; see also Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at
805.
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does not offer one at all.  As a result, the LEP applicant is unable 
to successfully complete an application for a driver’s license in their 
state of residence and is effectively denied meaningful access to this 
important service because of the applicant’s national origin based 
on language.134  The LEP patron at the DMV is “excluded from 
participation” in the driver’s license program, “denied the benefits 
of” the DMV’s services while similarly situated English-speaking 
customers are not, and the LEP patron is subjected to national 
origin discrimination because they are being treated worse than 
English-speaking patrons solely because the LEP patron requires 
services in a language other than English.135 
Presumably, the DMV in this example would approach all 
requests for non-English-language examinations similarly and 
deny all LEP persons the meaningful access required by law.  Each 
applicant denied access could lodge a Title VI complaint with the 
federal government, and in each case the state would have to take 
affirmative steps toward providing meaningful access for LEP 
applicants in order to avoid a possible loss of funding.136  In essence, 
the DMV’s decision to deny a driver’s license examination to one 
LEP person leads to a presumption that all LEP persons would be 
denied meaningful access in much the same way.  Ultimately, the 
state would waste valuable time, energy, and resources dealing 
with each instance of intentional discrimination when providing 
language access to all LEP persons would be less costly and reduce 
the number of future Title VI complaints.  However, under 
Sandoval, because the discrimination the applicant experienced 
134. In this scenario, the applicant experienced the same kind of intentional
discrimination proscribed by Title VI under Sandoval.  See generally Alexander 
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).  While a state may provide an LEP person
with an interpreter, this is not the most cost-effective measure.  For example,
if an interpreter charges twenty dollars per hour (maximum) and five LEP
persons visit a DMV each day for two hours a piece, the DMV would incur
$70,000 in interpreter fees in a single year (assuming the DMV is closed fifteen
days per year for holidays, etc.).  Interpreters for less common languages might
charge substantially higher rates for their services.  A state might consider
these expenses to be an undue burden—and resist providing interpreters—or
pass these costs on to LEP customers.  See Siddharth Khanijou, Comment,
Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language Service Reimbursement May
Ensure Meaningful Access to Care for LEP Patients, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 855, 873 (2005).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
136. See id. § 2000d(1).
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was not outwardly intentional, but rather due to the DMV’s policy 
of providing driver’s license examinations only in English, the 
result is a disparate impact on non-English-speaking customers.137  
The LEP applicant in the example likely would not have any direct 
evidence that the DMV engaged in intentional discrimination 
forbidden under Section 601.138  Even if the DMV gave assurances 
that it would not engage in disparate impact discrimination 
pursuant to regulations promulgated under Section 602, the 
applicant would not have a cause of action.139   
To contend with Sandoval, each state should enhance 
protections for LEP persons seeking DMV services through the 
adoption of a minimum threshold rule that would: (1) guarantee 
LEP persons consistent meaningful access to DMV services as the 
state is the primary provider of these important services; (2) help 
states foresee DMV service disruptions to LEP communities and 
take proactive measures to prevent such disruptions before they 
happen; (3) reduce administrative and budgetary burdens through 
improved planning and a reduction in interpreter and litigation 
expenses; and (4) provide greater certainty as to which DMV 
services are readily available in languages other than English for 
LEP customers.140   
The rule would require state DMVs to provide all services and 
materials for language groups whose percentage of the state’s 
overall population meets the minimum threshold.  Each state would 
enforce the rule and it would provide LEP persons with a private 
cause of action in state courts.  States serious about codifying 
prohibitions against disparate impact discrimination in these 
circumstances could go one step further and declare that if the DMV 
violates the minimum threshold rule then that violation could serve 
as proof of intent for a private cause of action for intentional 
discrimination under Title VI.  LEP persons subjected to 
discrimination would then be able to file a formal complaint with 
the federal government and possibly litigate a claim for intentional 
discrimination based on national origin.  
137. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275.
138. See § 2000d(4).
139. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
140. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 321C-3.
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A. Adoption of a Minimum Threshold Rule Would Guarantee
Consistent Meaningful Access to DMV Services for a Vast Majority
of LEP Persons
Meaningful access does not exist for LEP persons when DMVs 
do not provide services in languages other than English across all 
service channels.141  The DOJ’s guidance for implementation of EO 
13166—which mandates recipients of federal financial assistance 
develop and implement affirmative measures to provide 
meaningful access to LEP persons—suggests recipients consider 
the “number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be served or 
likely to be encountered by the program or grantee.”142  For 
example, supplying interpreters may provide LEP persons with 
meaningful access in the moment, but this measure may fail to 
provide the same level of access for LEP persons seeking services 
online, over the phone, or through the mail.   
EO 13166 states that if a recipient fails to implement a 
language access policy, then it could be found in violation of Title 
VI’s disparate impact regulations and might put the recipient’s 
federal funding at risk of being revoked.143  The “number or 
proportion of LEP persons eligible to be served or likely to be 
encountered”144 by a state’s DMV is almost one-hundred percent 
because a driver’s license or state ID is often required in many 
aspects of daily life, such as banking, employment, transportation, 
travel, and more.145  In fact, since driver’s licenses and state IDs 
141. Here, “all service channels” includes oral, print, and digital
instructions, information, and services.  Under the proposed rule, DMVs would 
also be required to provide interpreters for the road test portion of all LEP 
persons’ driver’s license examinations. 
142. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21136, at *2 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Department of 
Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title 
VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited 
English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002)). 
143. § 2000d(1).
144. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin 
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
41,459. 
145. Minor children may not need any DMV services, but they will certainly
need DMV services once they reach the minimum age required for a driver’s 
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expire, many LEP persons will require DMV services more than 
once in their lifetimes.  However, when application materials, 
official communications, and employee assistance are provided only 
in English, LEP persons are effectively denied the benefits of a 
driver’s license or state ID and excluded from being able to 
participate equally in DMV programs.146   
Foreseeability and knowledge of the disproportionate burden 
placed on LEP persons compared to their English-speaking 
neighbors are also factors in whether a recipient is providing 
meaningful access to its programs and activities.147  In South 
Camden Citizens in Action, the plaintiffs based their Title VI claim, 
in part, on the “knowledge of the impact of a facially neutral 
policy.”148  The district court denied the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection’s motion to dismiss, finding that the 
plaintiffs’ alleged facts, if proven true, showed “that the [defendant] 
was well-aware of the potential disproportionate and 
discriminatory burden placed upon that community and failed to 
take measures to assuage that burden.”149  The district court found 
the Supreme Court and Third Circuit’s precedents clearly stated 
“that a case of intentional discrimination is often based upon the 
type of circumstantial evidence which the SCCIA150 Plaintiffs 
allege[d] . . . namely, disparate impact, history of the state action, 
and foreseeability and knowledge of the discriminatory onus placed 
upon the complainants.”151   
license.  Almost every LEP person will need DMV services at some point in 
their life. 
146. See Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 800–01 (N.D. Ohio
2003). 
147. Id. at 806; S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 497 (D.N.J. 2003). 
148. Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 806; see S. Camden Citizens in Action,
254 F. Supp. 2d at 489.  In this case, the residents of a mostly minority 
community sued to enjoin construction of a cement grinding facility, which, 
plaintiffs claimed, would have a disparate impact on the residents of their 
community in violation of Title VI.  S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 
2d at 489. 
149. Id. at 497.
150. The district court used this initialism for “South Camden Citizens in
Action.”  Id. at 489. 
151. Id. at 497 (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465
(1979); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 
(1977); Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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Without question, meaningful access to services for LEP 
persons is severely limited when DMVs provide materials, 
applications, and services only in English.  Therefore, it is likely 
that LEP customers will lodge complaints—whether formally or 
informally—and put offending DMVs across the country on notice 
that their conduct has a disproportionate effect on LEP 
customers.152  It is feasible, then, that a court may find a DMV’s 
decision not to provide services in other languages in the absence of 
formal complaints is mere pretext for willful and intentional 
discrimination based on national origin.153  “The Supreme Court 
. . . has recognized that ‘disproportionate impact is not the sole 
touchstone of invidious discrimination,’” but disproportionate 
impact “is often probative of why the action was taken in the first 
place since people usually intend the natural consequences of their 
actions.”154 
States might argue that it would be difficult to provide 
meaningful access to each DMV service in every language spoken 
within a state’s borders because of cost or other seemingly practical 
reasons.  To mitigate states’ concerns here, a minimum threshold 
rule would require that a language minority must reach a specific 
threshold percentage of a state’s overall population before the state 
is required to provide all DMV materials and services in a given 
language.155  This threshold could be as low as one-tenth of one 
percent and still only encompass a small number of languages other 
than English.  For example, in its Title VI Program report 
submitted in 2018, the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority 
identified only seven languages other than English that were 
spoken by more than one-tenth of one percent of the state’s 
152. See Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21136, at *19 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (despite no formal 
complaints filed, defendant knew complaints had been threatened and 
requests were made to take driver’s license examinations in other languages). 
153. See id.
154. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495–96 (citing Pryor,
288 F.3d at 563); see Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21136, at *17.  
155. In Faith Action for Community Equity, Hawaii used U.S. Census
Bureau data from 2006 to identify the percentage of the state’s population that 
did not speak English well or at all in order to determine into which languages 
the state should translate its driver’s license examinations.  2015 LEXIS 
21136, at *7. 
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population.156  Setting a threshold percentage would ensure that 
DMVs provide the requisite meaningful access to a vast majority of 
their LEP patrons.  The rule would still provide meaningful access 
on an as-needed basis for languages that fall below the minimum 
threshold.   
B. Adoption of a Minimum Threshold Rule Would Encourage
States to Take Proactive Measures to Avoid Foreseeable Service
Disruptions for LEP Persons
In its EO 13166 guidance, the DOJ indicates recipients should 
also consider the “frequency with which LEP individuals come into 
contact with” their services when recipients develop policies to 
ensure meaningful access for LEP persons.157  When LEP persons 
consistently require a recipient’s services and are repeatedly denied 
meaningful access, there is a history of discriminatory state action 
not merely “in spite of,” but rather “because of” non-English-
speaking individuals’ membership in a protected class.158  The 
Supreme Court has said that disparate impact “is not irrelevant”159 
and that when there is no plausible, neutral explanation for a 
statute’s discriminatory impact, the “impact itself would signal that 
the real classification made by the law was in fact not neutral.”160  
156. R.I. PUB. TRANSIT AUTH., RIPTA TITLE VI PROGRAM 7 2018-2021 (2018),
https://www.ripta.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/06/title_vi_program_2018_2021_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9CW-VGA4].  Rhode Island’s total LEP population is 
approximately 84,295 out of a state population of just over one million (8.4%).  
Id.  The language breakdown of the total LEP population was as follows: 
Spanish (57.6%); Portuguese (14.1%); French (7.3%); Mandarin Chinese 
(3.6%); Cambodian (2.3%); Laotian (2%); Italian (1.6%); and Other (11.5%).  Id.  
157. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin 
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 
41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002). 
158. Pryor, 288 at 567-68. See also Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21136, at *14.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that 
“violations of equal protection and Title VI require similar proofs—plaintiffs 
must show that actions of the defendants had a discriminatory impact, and 
that defendants acted with intent or purpose to discriminate based upon 
plaintiffs’ membership in a protected class.”  Id. (quoting Comm. Concerning 
Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
159. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977). 
160. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21136, at *16.
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Taking the Supreme Court’s reasoning one step further, it is 
reasonable to conclude that if the discriminatory impact of a DMV’s 
policies on LEP persons cannot be plausibly explained on neutral 
grounds, then the policies’ impact would indicate that the real 
reason they were created was not neutral.  Such evidence creates a 
history of state action not of mere indifference, but of purposeful 
discrimination. 
In FACE, Hawaii Chief District Court Judge Susan Oki 
Mollway explained that “[p]urposeful discrimination ‘implies more 
than . . . intent as awareness of consequences.’”161  “‘It implies that 
the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group.’”162  The plaintiffs in that case 
showed that the Hawaii Department of Transportation (HDOT) 
“knew it had administered [four thousand] exams in various 
languages in 2007 in the City and County of Honolulu alone,” and 
that HDOT “knew that translating [the driver’s license exam] 
would have involved minimal time and resources.”163  Judge 
Mollway concluded that under these circumstances, a jury could 
“reasonably infer from the delay between 2008 and 2014 that the 
state intended to discriminate against various national origins, 
foreseeing the disparate impact” on LEP persons.164  Similarly, 
courts in other states could infer that when a DMV is aware of the 
discriminatory impact of its policies—and could easily course 
correct without any undue burden but declines to do so—the DMV’s 
discrimination may in fact be intentional.165  
161. Id. at *15 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)). 
162. Id. at *15–16 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (1979)).  In fact, the
court could consider several factors to determine whether the HDOT engaged 
in intentional discrimination based on national origin, including:  
(1) statistics demonstrating a “clear pattern unexplainable on grounds
other than” discriminatory ones, (2) “[t]he historical background of the
decision,” (3) “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision,” (4) the defendant’s departures from its normal
procedures or substantive conclusions, and (5) relevant “legislative or
administrative history.”
Id. at *17–18 (quoting Pac. Shores Props., L.L.C. v. City of Newport Beach, 730 
F.3d 1142, 1158−59 (9th Cir. 2013)).
163. Id. at *19.
164. Id.
165. See generally id.
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Similarly, the plaintiffs in Almendares alleged that Ohio and 
Lucas County purposefully discriminated against LEP persons 
when the defendants “chose to continue a policy of failing to ensure 
bilingual services and knowing that Spanish-speaking applicants 
and recipients of food stamps were being harmed as the 
consequence.”166  The plaintiffs alleged they were “harmed—either 
by benefits being delayed or changed—because they could not 
understand the English-language materials.”167  The district court 
reasoned that if the plaintiffs’ claims were true, “one could logically 
infer that the policy was implemented and [was] being continued 
‘because of’ its impact on national origin.”168   
The defendants in FACE and Almendares engaged in informed 
decision-making that purposely denied meaningful access to LEP 
persons similarly situated to their English-speaking peers on the 
basis of national origin.169  In the same way a DMV knows its 
customers (the residents of the state), it knows or can easily find 
out the percentage of the population that does not speak English 
well or at all, and interacts with LEP persons on a regular basis. 
Adoption of a minimum threshold rule would benefit states because 
it would provide a clear benchmark for when DMVs are required to 
provide permanent access across all service channels in specific 
languages.   
C. Adoption of a Minimum Threshold Rule Would Ensure States,
as the Primary Providers of Critical DMV Services, Provide Equal
Access for LEP Persons
 DMVs provide undeniably important services.170  In its EO 
13166 guidance, the DOJ identified “the nature and importance of 
the program, activity, or service provided by the program to people’s 
lives” as a key factor for recipients’ consideration as they develop 
and put in place “a system by which LEP persons can meaningfully 
166. Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
167. Id. at 807.
168. Id. at 808.
169. See Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21136, at
*16–18; Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
170. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 508 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding a
lack of driver’s licenses adversely impacts individuals via lost economic 
opportunities, social services, and overall quality of life), rev’d on other 
grounds, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001). 
154 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:123 
access those services.”171  This will ensure the “programs and 
activities [the DMV] normally provide[s] in English are accessible 
to LEP persons and thus do not discriminate on the basis of national 
origin in violation of [T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, and its implementing regulations.”172 
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Title VI regulations 
state that “[d]ecisions by a Federal, state, or local entity to make an 
activity compulsory, such as requiring a driver to have a license, 
can serve as strong evidence of the importance of the program or 
activity.”173  Thus, each state should be obligated to provide 
materials, communications, and services in a variety of languages. 
A driver’s license is often essential for transportation.  Without one, 
an LEP person may be unable to get to work, making it that much 
more difficult to put food on the table and provide for their family. 
A driver’s license or state ID is necessary to complete employment 
forms.174  A valid government-issued photo ID is required to get on 
an airplane for both domestic and international travel.  A person 
may be required to show ID to purchase beer or wine at a liquor 
store or buy a pack of cigarettes at a gas station.  Some of these 
reasons may be more serious than others, but LEP persons would 
be denied the benefits and enjoyment of each of these liberties if 
they do not have meaningful access to the means of exercising these 
freedoms. 
LEP persons ought to be able to go to a state’s DMV, complete 
an application, and receive services in a language that they 
understand.  LEP patrons should be able to visit a DMV’s website 
and navigate its offerings in the comfort of their own home without 
the use of a translator.  An LEP person’s driver’s license should not 
expire because the notice they received in the mail was in a 
language they did not understand.  The failure to provide services 
in languages other than English—when DMVs are fully aware that 
171. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin 
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 
41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002). 
172. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
173. Policy Guidance Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to Limited
English Proficient (LEP) Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087, 74,092 (Dec. 14, 2005). 
174. One could also use a U.S. passport, but it would likely be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to apply for one without first obtaining a valid state-
issued form of identification. 
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thousands of LEP customers walk through their doors each year—
purposefully denies LEP persons the benefits of important services 
necessary to live in the United States.  It is intentional 
discrimination based on national origin in direct violation of Title 
VI.175  As the primary provider of DMV services, implementation of
a minimum threshold rule would ensure that states are able to meet
the needs of a vast majority of LEP constituents.
D. A Minimum Threshold Rule Will Reduce Administrative Cost
Burdens and Provide Greater Certainty for States and their LEP
Residents
After the federal government, state governments are in the 
best position and have the most resources available to develop and 
implement policies and practices that would provide LEP persons 
meaningful access to DMV services. EO 13166 encourages 
recipients to “develop and implement a system” to improve access 
to services for LEP persons but “without undu[e] burden[ ].”176  In 
other words, when effectuating the EO’s goals, the strain on a 
recipient’s available resources matters only if its LEP improvement 
plan places too great a burden on the recipient’s “fundamental 
mission.”177  States might argue additional costs are a sufficient 
burden to warrant noncompliance.  However, recipients risk 
making this argument in bad faith because of the relatively 
inexpensive costs of making meaningful improvements. 
In FACE, HDOT did not offer driver’s license examinations in 
languages other than English between 2008 and 2013.178  Because 
the State of Hawaii was a recipient of federal financial assistance, 
HDOT was required to provide meaningful access to services for 
LEP persons.179  After conducting surveys and meeting with 
community members, HDOT requested funding to translate its 
most recent driver’s license examination into twelve languages 
175. See discussion supra Section I.E.
176. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. at 50,121.
177. Id.
178. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21136, at *2–10 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015). 
179. Id. at *6.
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besides English.180  HDOT’s request noted the approximate cost of 
translating the examination was six hundred dollars per 
language.181  States might argue that six hundred dollars per 
language is burdensome on tight administrative budgets.  However, 
the DOJ’s guidance mentions undue burdens on “small businesses, 
small local governments, [and] small nonprofits.”182  State 
governments clearly do not fall within any of the categories 
mentioned by the DOJ. 
Six hundred dollars likely represents a significant cost savings 
for states compared to costs they would incur for interpreters for 
each LEP person’s visit to the DMV.  The translations are also more 
affordable than litigating potentially countless intentional 
discrimination claims each year and risking future federal funding 
entirely simply because the DMV did not have exams in languages 
other than English.  Using data from the annual American 
Community Survey, DMVs can forecast which language minority 
groups would reach the state’s established threshold percentage 
requirement for DMV services and budget for those changes in 
advance which would provide states with some budgetary 
certainty.183 
In addition, a minimum threshold rule will create more 
certainty for LEP persons because they would know in advance 
whether services will be available in their language.  Conversely, 
language minority groups whose percentage of a state’s overall 
population falls below the established minimum threshold would 
know in advance that services in their language are not readily 
available and arrangements with the DMV must be made in 
advance.  However, under a minimum threshold rule most LEP 
persons would be assured that their state’s DMV provides services 
180. Id. at *10.  Beginning on March 17, 2014, Hawaii’s driver’s license
examination was offered in Chinese, Chuukese, English, Hawaiian, Ilocano, 
Japanese, Korean, Marshallese, Samoan, Spanish, Tagalog, Tongan, and 
Vietnamese.  Id. 
181. Id.
182. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin 
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 
41,455, 41,458 (June 18, 2002) (emphasis added). 
 183. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. CMTY. SURVEY, 
https://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/demographic/american_comm
unity_survey.html [https://perma.cc/QH22-W3QJ] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020). 
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in their native language.184  This would not represent an undue 
burden on states and such a rule is faithful to the DOJ’s guidance 
and Title VI.  
E. Envisioning a State-Level Minimum Threshold Rule in Action
Assume that a state provides its DMV administrators with
reliable state-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau that shows 
that in 2020, eight percent (8%) of the population “does not speak 
English very well.”185  Let us say the eight percent (8%) breaks 
down as follows: three percent (3%) speak Spanish, two percent 
(2%) speak Haitian Creole, one percent (1%) speak Arabic, two-
thirds of one percent (0.66%) speak Vietnamese, two-fifths of one 
percent (0.4%) speak Portuguese, one-third of one percent (0.34%) 
speak Mandarin, three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) speak Italian, 
two-tenths of one percent (0.2%) speak Norwegian, and one-tenth 
of one percent (0.1%) speak Somali.  Suppose the DMV currently 
provides services only in English.  Assume further that LEP 
persons have visited the DMV previously and have requested 
services in their native languages but have effectively been denied 
services because the DMV has not translated anything into 
languages other than English.  
Upon learning that LEP communities make up the above 
proportions of the state’s population, the DMV continues to provide 
driver’s license examinations only in English, which denies LEP 
communities the same degree of meaningful access enjoyed by 
English-speaking patrons.  Here, the DMV has made an intentional 
decision not to provide translated examinations, this discriminates 
against LEP persons because the DMV has continued its practices 
knowing full well the discriminatory consequences of its conduct. 
184. In Rhode Island, for example, 86,168 residents aged five years and over
speak English less than very well.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DETAILED LANGUAGES 
SPOKEN AT HOME AND ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH FOR THE POPULATION 5 YEARS
AND OVER: 2009-2013 (2015).  Spanish (including Spanish Creole) (50,073), 
Portuguese (including Portuguese Creole) (13,063), Chinese (2,720), (French 
Creole (2,367), French (including Patois, Cajun) (2,029), and Italian (1,762) 
account for 72,014 or almost eighty-four percent of LEP persons in Rhode 
Island. Id. 
185. People that Speak English Less Than “Very Well” in the United States,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/people-that-speak-
english-less-than-very-well.html [https://perma.cc/N774-HGMA]. 
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This is not mere “deliberate indifference” and represents 
intentional discrimination because there is no plausible 
explanation on neutral grounds for the DMV’s continuation of its 
discriminatory practices.186   
In order to avoid complaints of intentional discrimination, and 
possible litigation, the state should adopt a rule that when an LEP 
community’s population rises above an established minimum 
threshold percentage of the state’s overall population, the DMV 
must automatically translate driver’s license and state ID 
applications, provide on-call, real-time interpreting services, full 
website translations, and all other services in the necessary 
language.  States would be granted a one-year grace period to make 
these accommodations for languages that qualify under the rule.187  
During this grace period, however, DMVs would be required to 
cover the costs of interpreters and translators as needed in order to 
incentivize timely compliance with the rule.  In this example, 
imagine the state adopts a threshold percentage of one-third of one 
percent (0.33%), or two-thousand individuals, whichever is less. 
Here the DMV must make the above-mentioned language access 
improvements for Spanish, Haitian Creole, Arabic, Vietnamese, 
Portuguese, and Mandarin-speaking LEP patrons because these 
language groups comprise more than the state-established 
threshold.   
Presumably the DMV would be less likely to encounter 
someone who speaks Italian, Norwegian, or Somali than someone 
who speaks Spanish or Arabic.  Under the proposed rule, the DMV 
would not be obligated to make all of the same improvements for 
language minority groups that fall below the established threshold 
percentage.  Therefore, Italian, Norwegian, and Somali speakers 
would have to make arrangements for language accommodations in 
advance (the DMV is still obligated to provide meaningful access 
under Title VI).188  These language accommodations would differ in 
that the DMV would be required to translate materials and provide 
interpreter services only for the specific purpose of the LEP person’s 
186. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, No. 13-00450 2015 U.S. Dist. WL
751134 at *6 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015). 
187. Using data from the most recent American Community Survey, DMVs
would be able to anticipate whether a specific language group is likely to reach 
(or fall below) the state’s qualifying threshold in the coming year or two. 
188. This is based on the assumption that none of these language groups
consist of more than two-thousand individuals. 
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visit.  However, this minimum threshold rule would cover a large 
majority of states’ LEP persons while also being mindful of limited 
resources.  If a language minority’s population reaches the 
established threshold in subsequent years, the DMV could request 
or earmark resources in anticipation of the need to make the 
requisite language access improvements within the one-year grace 
period. 
CONCLUSION 
 In a post-Sandoval landscape, it is without question that 
LEP persons currently do not have a private cause of action for 
disparate impact discrimination based on race, color, or national 
origin against recipients of federal financial assistance under Title 
VI.189  What remains unclear is what evidence a plaintiff must
show to prove the discriminatory effects of a recipient’s conduct are
intentional and not merely the result of “deliberate indifference.”190
Absent clear guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress—and
for the reasons set forth above—each state should adopt a proposed
minimum threshold rule as a meaningful step towards codifying
prohibitions on disparate impact discrimination on a state level and
to prevent taxpayer dollars from funding the kind of invidious
discrimination that spurred passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
189. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
190. Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2002).
